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T

he ongoing debate about capital punishment in the United States juggles
several contentious questions. Innocence, cost, racial fairness, proportionality,
retributivist calculus, and deterrence concerns thread a literature whose richness
testifies to the endurance of capital punishment in American legal and political culture.
For proponents of capital punishment, the connection between the moral and utilitarian or
consequentialist positions trumps all other concerns: They suggest that if the death penalty
can prevent—through the incapacitation of the offender and general deterrence of would-be
killers—the loss of even one innocent life from murder, then execution is a morally justified
or perhaps even morally required penal response (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2005).1 This
linkage raises the stakes in the death penalty beyond policy considerations (Garland, 2011;
Steiker and Steiker, 2010; Zimring, 2003) and elevates the question of whether executions
deter to near primacy in this debate.
The latest work on executions and murders reported by Kenneth C. Land, Raymond
H. C. Teske, and Hui Zheng (2012, this issue), together with reports from previous stages of
their Texas capital punishment project (Land, Teske, and Zheng, 2009), takes its place in the
recurring debate surrounding the deterrence question (Nagin and Pepper, 2012). As with its
predecessors, Land et al.’s work has implications for both the moralist and consequentialist
Direct correspondence to Jeffrey Fagan, Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School,
435 West 116th Street, New York, NY 10027 (e-mail: Jeffrey.Fagan@law.columbia.edu).
1.

Cass R. Sunstein later joined with Justin Wolfers (2008), whose work with John Donohue (Donohue and
Wolfers, 2005) was critical of the Sunstein–Vermeule (2005) analysis, to clarify their respective
assessment of the evidence of a deterrent effect of executions on murder. A few years later, Sunstein
and Wolfers (2008) concluded that “the best reading of the accumulated data is that they do not
establish a deterrent effect of the death penalty.”

!
C 2012 American Society of Criminology
DOI:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2012.00832.x
Criminology & Public Policy ! Volume 11 ! Issue 3

579

Policy Essay

Impacts of Executions on Homicides

positions, perhaps more so than studies done in other death penalty states. Texas is special
for three reasons. First, the state has been the dominant user of executions in the decades
since the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a brief moratorium in Furman v. Georgia (1972).
Since executions resumed in Texas in 1982 after the Supreme Court decision in Gregg v.
Georgia (1976), Texas’s 472 executions through 2011 account for more than one third of
all executions in the United States (Death Penalty Information Center, 2012).
The second reason to focus on Texas is that much of the deterrent effect observed in
the post-Gregg deterrence studies is leveraged by the influence of Texas (Berk, 2005). Berk
observed that any evidence of the impacts of executions on homicide rates can be dismissed
for U.S. death states other than Texas. So, if executions can show a distinctive impact on
death-eligible killings anywhere, then Texas should be the place. Given its high rate of
executions, the case for the impact of the death penalty on homicide cannot be so easily
dismissed if we observe deterrence in Texas (Fagan, Zimring, and Geller, 2006).
The third reason is that Texas offers a unique opportunity to estimate the marginal
deterrent effect of execution beyond the next most serious punishment: a sentence to natural
death in prison or life without the possibility of parole (commonly known as LWOP). The
unique opportunity to test the marginal deterrent effects of execution compared with LWOP
emerges in Texas in two ways. One way is the enactment of LWOP as a sentencing option
for capital-eligible murders in September 2005, in the midst of the lengthy time series
of murders and executions that Land et al. (2012) examine for evidence of deterrence.
Such opportunities for natural experiments in criminal justice are rare but can offer strong
evidence of the effects of new law or policy (Fagan, 1990). Second, as a result of the
new LWOP statute, Texas now has high rates of both executions and LWOP sentences
(Olsen, 2011).2 The dual high prevalence of the two most severe sanctions available for
capital-eligible murders provides fertile ground for a robust test of the deterrence hypothesis.
How to view the contributions of Land et al.’s (2012) article is the focus of this policy
essay. Several longstanding parameters of this debate will help us to gauge its contributions.
And a closer look at the capital punishment regime in Texas also may help to place Land
et al.’s (2009, 2012) work in a broader social science and jurisprudential context on capital
punishment that will shape how these inquiries might look in the future.
Deterrence
Land et al.’s (2012) research is located in a streamlined framework of deterrence that departs
significantly from contemporary renderings of deterrence, whether applied to murder or
2.
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The Texas LWOP statute also provided opportunity for age-specific experimentation on the effects of
LWOP on young murder offenders. From September 2005 to September 2009, Texas allowed life
without parole prison sentences for juvenile offenders under the age of 18 years at the time of their
offense who had been certified to stand trial as adults. SB 839 changed Texas law to bar such
punishment in September 2009. By then, 21 people in Texas had been sentenced for crimes they
committed before 18 years of age.

Criminology & Public Policy

Fagan, Geller, and Zimring
other crimes. The basic Becker–Ehrlich logic of the economic approach to crime (Becker,
1968, 2006; Ehrlich, 1975) is nowhere to be found in the Land et al. (2012) work. The key
feature of the economic approach is the assumption that (a) criminal acts are purposeful
choices that are subject to individual utility functions, (b) actions are bounded by social
influences including rational or irrational views about the consequences of actions, and (c)
those costs are created through cascades of legal interventions, from detection to prosecution,
sentencing, and punishment.
Dozens of studies on executions and murder have followed this design (see Donohue,
2009; Fagan, 2006; Nagin and Pepper, 2012, for reviews), including the recent efforts by
Kovandzic, Vieraitis, and Boots (2009) and Donohue and Wolfers (2009). All are rooted in
choice theory, consistent with Becker, and all, regardless of discipline, seek to identify a causal
link between executions (or death sentences) and offender choices to commit homicides.
Theoretical work on crime and deterrence has moved beyond those early cost-centric
formulations to broaden the notion of choice and incentives. New work on deterrence
focuses on perceptions of both risks and rewards of crime, the rationality calculus of
criminal offenders, dose-response effects of various sanctions, and several individual-level
factors that may either moderate or mediate the sanction–crime relationship (Apel, 2012;
Loughran, Piquero, Fagan, and Mulvey, 2012; Nagin, 1998; Nagin and Paternoster, 1994;
Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, and Loughran, 2011; Robinson and Darley, 2004; Williams
and Hawkins, 1986; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973).
But neither of these versions of deterrence is the focus of Land et al.’s (2012)
project. Instead, this article and the previous publication join many studies of deterrence
that examine the joint stochastic processes that link homicides (however measured) and
executions across time, without specifying the intervening processes. Land et al.’s project
foregoes a detailed specification of the sanctioning regime for capital-eligible murders where
execution is the end of the line that starts with detection risks and ends with execution or
another form of incapacitative punishment. It is agnostic on the substantive influences on
the choices that offenders make given execution risks. Apart from individual differences,
Land et al.’s approach also assumes that the characteristics of the choice are independent of
local contexts—the work is silent on local crime or social conditions in neighborhoods,
the efficiency of the local police and courts to detect and punish crimes, the signals
of risk that emanate from those authorities, the availability or likelihood of alternative
harsh punishments, and the social networks of offenders and would-be offenders that
communicate risk. Each of these matters is detailed in the next section.

Which Homicides?
One comparative advantage of Land et al.’s (2012) work is the disaggregation of homicides
into components. This strategy is done for several good reasons. Not all homicides are
eligible for a death sentence, nor are all equally deterrable (see, e.g., Shepherd, 2004, 2005).
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Since Gregg, the cherished idea that “death is different” has guided states to craft death
penalty statutes that reserve execution for offenders who meet statutorily defined capital
eligibility requirements (Abramson, 2004; Steiker and Steiker, 2010). State statutes base
capital eligibility in part on grades of heinousness or premeditation; they also include
“felony murders” where killings take place in the course of commission of a nonhomicide
felony crime. But even that threshold does not capture the totality and complexity of
killings that are capital eligible. Other homicides—such as killings of police or children, or
multiple victim shootings—evoke normative outrage that motivates legislatures to create
eligibility for the death penalty for such crimes (Sharon, 2011; Simon and Spaulding,
1999). An effective death penalty would produce changes in the heterogeneous categories
of homicides that are death eligible and that face the threat of execution.
Land et al.’s (2012) project is not the first to have tried this. In 2006, Fagan, Zimring,
and Geller published a study that disaggregated Texas homicides into two groups—those
potentially eligible for a death penalty (approximately 25% of all kills) and non–deatheligible killings (the other 75%) (Fagan et al., 2006). The study investigated whether
death-eligible killings responded to Texas execution rates and found that they did not. We
showed that almost the entire decline in homicides that happened in Texas involved killings
that did not risk a death sentence. We concluded that the variation in execution rates
would not be a plausible influence on the variation in non–death-eligible killings under the
conventional theories of deterrence.
This latest version of Land et al.’s (2012) Texas analysis addresses only a subset of this
group of capital-eligible murders: “felony homicides.” Accordingly, the unique contribution
of Land et al.’s (2012) project is unclear because felony murders are only a part of the story
of capital punishment in Texas. The Texas capital punishment statute (Texas Penal Code
§19.03) lists a set of other aggravators that render first-degree murder eligible for capital
punishment: killings of children younger than 6 years of age, killings of police officers or staff
in correctional institutions, mass shootings, murder for hire, and murder during a prison
escape. There is no doubt that felony murders are an important piece of the “market share”
of capital-eligible homicides, but they are only approximately half of all capital-eligible
homicides (Fagan et al., 2006).
Our 2006 study applied the criteria and definition from §19.03 to the Supplemental
Homicide Report data to estimate that 21.1% of all homicides in Texas 1977–2003 were
capital eligible. Table 1, which is adapted from Fagan et al. (2006), shows that 54.6% of
all capital-eligible homicides were felony murders. Among felony murders, nearly 80% of
those were murders committed during the course of robberies. The rest fell into several
other categories of capital eligibility in the Texas statute, in which multiple victim shootings
is the second largest category.
The challenge remaining in Land et al.’s (2012) study is to estimate the effects of
executions on the rest of the pool of capital-eligible homicides: the 45.5% that were nonfelony murder, capital-eligible homicides. Readers are left to wonder whether these other
582
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1

Capital-Eligible Homicides, Texas, 1977–2003
Category

Homicides during crimes
Institution killings
Gangland killings
Youth gang killings
Sniper killings
Murders of children 6 and younger
Killings of police officers
Multiple victims
Total capital eligible
Total non–capital eligible
Total

N

% of All Homicides

% of Capital-Eligible Homicides

5,723
117
259
155
18
1,520
148
3,725
10,476
39,060
49,536

11.6
0.2
0.5
0.3
0.0
3.1
0.3
7.5
21.1
78.9
100.0

54.6
1.1
2.5
1.5
0.2
14.5
1.4
35.6
100.0

Source: Adapted from Fagan, Zimring, and Geller (2006).

capital-eligible homicides were included in the non-felony category and treated in one group
with other non–capital-eligible homicides. If so, the value of segregating felony homicides
is diminished in the search for deterrence. Multiple-victim shootings, for example, which
in Table 1 comprise more than a third of capital-eligible homicides in Texas, are different in
motivation and most likely in offender attributes from second-degree murders that ensue
from bar fights or road rage incidents. We are left to wonder which side of the ledger in
Land et al.’s study accounts for these killings.
Figure 1 provides a picture of the trends over time in these two forms of capital-eligible
killings. In our study, we hypothesized that the marginal deterrent effect of execution would
be concentrated in the death-eligible homicide group. The differential impact we found
suggests that the variations in execution were not the feature that is driving reductions in
homicide in Texas over time. Extending our time series from 2003 to 2009, in an era of
declining executions, suggests that nothing has changed. In fact, from 2001 to 2009, the
numbers of felony murders and other non-felony murder, capital-eligible killings in Texas
have been just about equal.
Deterrence may or may not exist in Texas, but if the goal of separating homicides into
those that are capital eligible and those that are not is to better identify the deterrent effects
of executions, then limiting the analysis only to felony murders pulls the rug out from under
the enterprise. Let’s assume, however, that the basic finding of transient deterrent effects
of executions on non-felony murders is right. But which of this heterogeneous category of
non-felony murders seems deterrable, even for a short moment? Is it the rest of the capital
eligible pool, or is it the barroom brawls or the jealous domestic rages? Both statutory and
policy considerations would benefit from an answer to that question. So, too, would the
moral argument that Sunstein and Vermeule (2005) brought into the debate.
Volume 11 ! Issue 3
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1

Capital-Eligible and Non–Capital-Eligible Homicides in Texas, 1976–2009
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The Supply of Capital Cases
Although Land et al.’s (2012) approach examines the deterrent effects of executions, those
cases represent the end of a winnowing process that reduces a larger pool of capitaleligible offenders to a far smaller number of those who, in effect, have lost a detection
and punishment lottery. The process relies on the skills (and perhaps luck) of the police to
catch offenders and launch a process that leads to prosecution as a capital-case, conviction,
sentencing, and punishment. The detection process has implications both for creating the
supply of cases eligible for execution as well as for the mechanics of deterrence. If a choicetheoretic model of rational deterrence is right, then offenders who perceive low risks of
detection are unlikely to internalize these risks into the decision to commit a murder.
Consider how this sorting process worked out during the period of Land et al.’s (2012)
study. From 1994 to 2007, 19,951 killings were classified in the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reports as murder or manslaughter. Applying the Texas capital murder statute, we estimate
that 21.1% of all murders were capital eligible. The pool is then narrowed by apprehension
risk. The Texas Department of Public Safety reports that about 75% of all murders in 2009
were cleared by arrest of an identified suspect, a rate that is fairly stable over time in Texas
584
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(Fagan et al., 2006). The rate was approximately the same for capital-eligible and other
homicides.
These arrests produced a total of 450 death sentences in Texas in the 1994–2007
window of Land et al.’s (2012) study (Death Penalty Information Center, 2012). At the
end of the punishment regime for capital-eligible crimes, 423 executions occurred during
this period (Texas Department of Corrections, 2012). The estimates of death sentences and
executions obviously include murders that took place before 2004 and exclude those who
were sentenced after 2007. Still, these events establish the basic parameters of deterrence
contingencies to would-be killers and are essential parts of the signal of both punishment
risk and cost that comprise a deterrence regime (Fagan, 2006). Using simple if not
crude math, a person committing any murder in Texas might think that he has about
a 2.1% chance of execution, and a person committing a capital-eligible murder—if he
knew the rules of aggravating circumstances—might think that he has a 10% chance of
execution during that period of time. This estimate does not take into consideration the
exonerations that took place during this time in Texas, nor the number of death sentences
that are reversed and resentenced to a term in prison (Liebman, Fagan, West, and Lloyd,
2000).
A rational decision maker would view these as long odds, if that person were concerned
only with execution as the cost to be avoided. But from what we know about murderers,
even that calculus is strained by cognitive distortions and the fact that a set of powerful and
complex rewards might lead to a decision that execution is a price worth risking (see, e.g.,
Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998; Katz, 1998).

Signaling Risk
How well does this lottery get the message across to deter homicides in general, and especially
that subset that are eligible for execution? Whether and how well offenders gain knowledge
of punishment risks is central to a deterrence argument. Although deterrence studies vary
in terms of their observational units (counties, states) over time, Land et al. (2012) chose
to aggregate responses across Texas’s 254 counties, assuming that risks not only are uniform
across the state but also are communicated with equal strength across those units. It is a
big assumption in a big state, and it bears on how we conceptualize the communication
component of deterrence.
Almost nothing is known about the awareness of sanction risks—arrest, sentencing, or
execution—among those who go on to commit homicides, and certainly none is known
about those who commit capital-eligible homicides. Still, it seems unlikely that most killers
are reading about execution risks in the newspapers or hearing about recent executions on
television or radio. Even when those announcements are available, they seem to have no
effect on deterrence in the days and weeks after an execution. Hjalmarsson (2009) studied
homicides in the days and weeks after newspaper announcements of executions in three
Volume 11 ! Issue 3
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2

Capital-Eligible and Non–Capital-Eligible Homicides, Largest Texas Counties,
1977–2009 (N,%)
County

Harris, Dallas, Bexar
Other counties
Total

Capital
Eligible

Felony Homicides
(Subset of Capital Eligible)

Other
Homicides

Total

6,029
(56.3)
4,676
(43.7)
10,705

4,359
(64.2)
2,429
(35.8)
6,788

25,923
(53.0)
22,947
(47.0)
48,870

31,952
(53.6)
27,623
(46.4)
59,575

Source: Adapted from Supplemental Homicide Reports, 1977–2009, ICPSR, NACJD.

large Texas cities from 1999 to 2004: Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio. She found no
evidence of deterrent effect when local executions received local media coverage.
This finding is important not just for its implications for the signaling question but also
for the overall Texas effect: Table 2 shows that these three counties (Harris, where Houston is
located; Dallas County; and Bexar County, where San Antonio is located) account for more
than half of the capital-eligible murders in Texas from 1977 to 2009 and a similar share
of total homicides. These counties account for nearly two thirds of the felony murders, a
major share of the capital-eligible homicides. If there are no media effects in these counties,
with their large media markets and high-population density, then it may be unreasonable
to expect announcement effects—if there are such announcements at all—in the sparser
counties across the states.
It might also be unrealistic to assume that news of executions travels efficiently across the
vast areas between Texas cities and their media markets. Consider that the state’s execution
facility is in the state prison in Huntsville, approximately 67 miles north of Houston in
the southeastern corner of the state. Execution announcements elsewhere would have to be
publicized to state population centers in north Texas (Amarillo, 575 miles from Huntsville)
or west Texas (El Paso, 750 miles from Huntsville) to amplify the signal of execution risk.
Moreover, executions come from only a handful of counties in the state, as do capital-eligible
murders. Again, the demands of deterrence for efficiency in information markets suggest
that these assumptions are strained if not unrealistic.
Alternative Punishments
Estimates of deterrence typically focus on the marginal deterrent effects of alternative
punishments as part of the punishment regime. In other words, at the end of this process
of production of sanctions, we should be able to observe the marginal effects of executions
compared with other punishment contingencies and realities. In the case of capital-eligible
punishments, the marginal effects might be estimated by comparing executions to lengthy
586
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prison sentences, including sentences of LWOP. Another way of considering marginal
deterrence for capital-eligible homicides is to consider the efficacy of sentencing for the
predicates of felony homicide: prison sentences for robberies. If robberies are the modal
category of felony murder, then a marginal deterrent effect might be discerned from
comparisons of executions for felony murder for robbery with prison sentences for robberies
(Fagan et al., 2006).
Land et al.’s (2009, 2012) projects do not consider either approach. Texas, however,
provides an important opportunity for a natural experiment on the effects of LWOP
sentences for capital-eligible murders. The state had no provision for LWOP sentences until
September 2005. Prior to the new law, defendants in Texas convicted of a capital-eligible
murder received either a death sentence or a minimum of 40 years in prison. Since the
state introduced the option of a life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence for capital murder in
September 2005—simultaneously eliminating the possibility of parole for capital crimes—
the number of capital cases filed has escalated, whereas the number of new death sentences
in Texas has decreased sharply from 48 in 1999 to 8 this year. According to the Houston
Chronicle (Olsen, 2011), 398 Texas offenders convicted of capital-eligible murder were
sentenced to life without parole since the 2005 passage of the LWOP law, compared with
66 people who were sentenced to death. The LWOP law has been used in approximately
one third of all Texas counties at least once.
Once again, not only does the volume of executions in Texas present unique
opportunities to study deterrence, but the state also presents unique opportunities to study
the effects of LWOP on plea bargaining (Kuziemko, 2006) and ultimately on sentences
using the types of stochastic models favored by Land et al. (2009, 2012). By way of preview
of what might forecast the results, Figure 1 shows the trends in capital-eligible and other
homicides before and after the passage of the LWOP law in 2005. Since 2000, murder
rates have decreased from 5.9 per 100,000 to 5.0 per 100,000 in 2010 (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2012). Executions in Texas have declined from 37 in 1999 to 17 in 2011
(Texas Department of Corrections, 2012). It seems that other than increasing the state’s
population of persons serving sentences of death in prison, there has been little effect
thus far either of the state’s new LWOP law or its sharp decline in executions on either
capital-eligible or other murders.

Conclusion
No matter which side of the debate they take, nearly all researchers agree that if we could
observe a deterrent effect from executions in the United States, it would be in Texas, the
nation’s leader in executions since the resumption of capital punishment in the United States
in 1977 (Berk, 2005; Fagan et al., 2006; Zimring, Fagan and Johnson, 2010). Yet the results
from the Land et al. (2009, 2012) projects suggest that the question of deterrence, based
on Texas data, remains a muddle. The most sensitive test of the marginal deterrent effect of
Volume 11 ! Issue 3
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executions in Texas is shown by the separation of capital-eligible and non–capital-eligible
cases in Figure 1. It provides no evidence that death-eligible cases are execution-sensitive.
The Land et al. (2012) study offers a partial though weaker confirmation of what we
concluded in our 2006 article, and what we have shown here.
The Land et al. (2012) study does little to resolve the muddle of why executions
evidently fail to deter. In our 2006 study, we use the standard “cost” or “risk of
unpleasantness” theory of deterrence to frame our hypothesis. In the Land et al. (2012)
study, no explicit theory is provided of what aspects of execution are supposed to influence
potential homicide offenders. If it is the risk of the potential killer to himself be executed,
then the results they obtain are the reverse of what deterrence theory would predict: The
group with the highest risk of death sentence shows a tiny, transient, and reversible effect
compared with the group (non-felony killings) with far lower death sentence risks. Even
momentary, transient, and entropic fluctuations in felony murders, the backbone of Land
et al.’s (2012) analysis, cannot conceal the overall pattern of nonresponsiveness of capitaleligible homicides to the threat of execution. This nonresponsiveness is even more stark in
the years of the past decade when execution threats were diminishing and when the use of
other harsh sanctions including LWOP sentences were increasing.
The uncertainty that infects the evidence on the deterrent effects of executions should
weigh heavily on the minds of legislators who use such evidence to inform judgments
and policy decisions. This uncertainty translates into risks that, in the interest of life–
life trade-offs, we may in fact end lives with no reliable evidence of any savings of lives.
This uncertainty creates heavy ethical demands. What is the appropriate response of the
ethical legislator to the uncertainty that plagues the question of whether executions deter?
Evidence from Texas seems to show that the world is not an orderly place organized around
the harmony of market equilibrium. Legislators should take notice.
Even with these uncertainties, researchers hoping to clarify or resolve the deterrence
question continue to search for the right set of econometric tools. But the question itself,
as well as those who stick with it, is hopelessly burdened by their search for the rational
murderer who, having decided to commit a murder that may be eligible for the death
penalty, stops before killing, looks around at the prospects of detection, listens to the
announcements of punishment risks and costs, and gladly risks a death in prison sentence
but is transfixed and transformed by the very long odds of being executed before dying of
natural causes. This is indeed a muddle if not an impossibility.
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